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If sleep is the apogee of physical relaxation, boredom is the apogee of mental relaxation. Boredom is the dream bird that hatches the egg of experiences. A rustling in the leaves drives it away” (Benjamin, The Story Teller, 2002, p. 149)

Background
This paper recognizes that we become bored. Through Heidegger, it seeks to provide a way to structure our understanding of boredom and suggest ways of acknowledging its cause, and then to allow it to liberate our authentic appreciation of the world of our workplace and what can be learnt through it. Using the approach of focusing on being in a societal workplace environment, and the link to Heidegger’s notion of mood, revealed in Being and Time, boredom’s fundamental role is shown as a complex temporal manifold. Our superficial attempts to deal with things in datable time means that we miss the essential importance of the temporal manifold through which our being is revealed and where the Augenblick​[1]​, (moment of vision)is the authentic present and temporalises itself of the authentic future (Heidegger, 1962,,p. 338).. For Heidegger this is to be understood as an ecstasies (ibid, p. 338) and when the resolute Dasein “is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered (ibid, p. 338)  .  Such resoluteness enables the private capabilities to arise in public practice not however, in the conformity of what ‘one does’ (das man) but as an authentically choosing being. The challenge of an ontological pedagogy, regardless of its place of revelation that this prescribes seems to me to be at the heart of any edifying mission. Instead of chasing it away through busyness a moment of vision could produce creative and authentic ways of being.
 	
Introduction
Boredom, as a concept, has a history beset with negative connotations. The modern conception of boredom has its antecedent in the medieval concept of acedia, one of the “seven deadly sins” in the Christian tradition and in direct tension with the virtue of agape, or love for all of God’s creation. Kierkegaard goes so far as to say it is the “root of all evil” (2004, p. 230). The modern and secular concept of boredom is rooted in profound social and economic changes and, as McDonald observes, is considered a “psychological malady, a social malaise or an aesthetic challenge, rather than a sin” (2009, p. 61). Boredom is acknowledged as a notion of temporal experience where it is read as a relationship between time (Husserl 2008; Heidegger 1995) and of activity, whether purposeful (Kant 2001, p. 151) or idle (Kierkegaard 2004). However, within the literature there is a further concept of boredom, one that offers a space for reflection, between disinterest and the despair that has been identified and attributed to modernity and post-modernity itself. This connection between modernity and boredom has been emphasized by a number of authors, for example in Simmel’s loss of identity and meaningfulness (1978), Benjamin’s atrophy of experience (2002), Svendsen’s supplication of meaning (2005), and Goldstein’s (2005) link to “modernization, a process that has rationalized and commoditised the conditions of human existence” (2005, p. 281). Pezze and Salzani (2009) trace this development in both philosophical and sociological terms to connect to what is known as the phenomena of boredom and modernity. Finally in the education sphere in the work of Stafford and Gregory (2006) and Mansikka(2009)
Simmel’s cultural perspective is, i feel a major socio-political contributions to the discussion of boredom is significant and sees our current state as one in which our cultivated existence “becomes the actual content of one’s efforts and valuations until one is surrounded on all sides by chains of undertaking and institutions intertwined in every direction but for which everywhere the definitive, valuable goals are lacking” (1992, p. 4). He argues that this material condition fosters a disinterestedness  to the world.  It is this disinterested lived experience that is  explored by Heidegger and it is Heidegger approach  that I wish to concentrate on  here.  Both I feel are concerned by the how a world is structured to encourage “busyness” and a craving for interests to ward off indifference and hide the emptiness of boredom for our inauthentic selves.  
It is to Heidegger that I turn for the benefit of this paper both because of his extensive discussion of the subject in his early works and also for the insights he offers in how boredom itself might offer the rupture of the public and authentic disclosure of being.  This is achieved through taking a stance on our own authenticity, and explores this through the clarity provided by an moment of vision In this I adopt the   Heideggerian phenomenological lived experience of boredom both as a reaction to and a consequence of modernity.  To do this I offer a background analysis of temporality within which we might understand boredom within modernity’s datable time and discuss how the  most  profound form of boredom is hidden by our acceptance of the cultural imperatives to have and to consume. The distractions of “busyness” and consumerism drive profound boredom from our integrated temporal experience​[2]​. 
Moreover, it is through a moment of vision that opportunities to see occur, and transformation is made possible. In Heideggerian terms, a  offers a glimpse of how we might transform ourselves from being in a state of falling (inauthentically busying ourselves in our world) to one of resoluteness (taking a personal stance and being open to a life with no intrinsic only relative meaning). This occurrence is not necessarily manifest in a miraculous vision, but rather in a redefinition of the past and the future. Dreyfus, for instance, describes it as “the total gestalt switch of Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world from inauthentic to authentic” (1992, p. 321).
I suggest that this transformation takes place within the context of our everyday activities, leaving unchanged their content. It may not necessarily be a moment in the sense of a flash of insight, but a process. I conclude, as have others, that boredom is not a uni-dimensional response that may be identified and dealt with, but a natural and important state of being. It has specific value in awakening our ability to experience meaningfulness, often through its negation; when bored, we may question meaning or, more precisely, lack of meaning by indifference. My reading of Heidegger supports my argument that this questioning is what is implicit in the thinking associated with edifying and being. 
I will particularly discuss the pervasiveness of profound boredom in our being, and then consider how we might learn within and through this boredom the authenticity of our being. Further, I will suggest that the realization of profound boredom associated with moment of vision needs an opportunity to arise, an educative situation relevant to all educational workplaces and provided through breaking the busy-ness of life to find empty time to think. Such thinking, which is primordial, seeks to see clearly the subject of its attention within the clearing of the referential use. This allows for thoughts that disclose, but which are not necessarily defendable by rational analysis as thinking relevant to answering that which it seeks to reveal. Such thinking can awaken our “originary” temporality, the temporality of profound boredom with modernity, and in so doing can awaken us to a potential for being that may rupture our taken-for-granted world view. This is possible when our disinterest in the present is seen as arousing a more primordial understanding of our temporal being, by conspicuously revealing our world and its possibilities. 
 It is achieved by existentially taking a stance on the emptiness of the presencing, by seeing our potential to be and by activating our capacity to reconfigure what is into what might be. The originary temporality to which I refer to is, for Heidegger, a unified structure consisting of the past, present and future. The originary future relates to the way we project ourselves forward into possibilities in life. It provides the projection for the entire threefold structure of originary temporality and differs from datable and world time in which we tend to function in our everyday existence; a time structure that is both imposed upon us, yet convenient to us. The authenticity of taking a stance within originary temporality.requires us to engage with profound boredom, rather than blocking it out or running away from it by means of superficial activities. It involves exploring what this attunement can reveal rather than encouraging its disappearance as a dismissal of the experience. 
Thus, learning to be resolute when aware of the kairos that is the moment of vision yields an opportunity to authentically flourish. Having contempt for profound boredom and constructing distractions denies us our potential and, as Benjamin reflects, drives away valueless endeavour, along with its constructive ability to offer absorbing experiences in our modern culture (Benjamin 2002). Embracing indifference can disclose the everyday so that we may see it for what it is, rather than what it has been made to represent. Any worldhood – the workplace, the classroom or the home – may offer the worker, student or parent ways in which they see more clearly, in an edifying process, how to take a stance on their own being. However, if ignored and hidden by activity and surveillance, boredom will leave only mediocrity and compliance.
Put simply, does the recognition of profound boredom inhibit learning or can it, in some insightful way, facilitate the achievement of authenticity in working towards taking a stance on our becoming? In this state of being, the repetitiveness of our everyday life may be seen for what it is, and where an alternative state of existence might be considered.  However, it is more; it enables one to understand oneself better within a societal situation and engage with it pragmatically, in a knowing and thinking manner. If I convince, indifference might be encouraged in these workplaces as a means to improve that which we chose to be.
This approach to boredom differs from that usually taken by the educational literature (for example Breidenstein 2007, and Mann and Robinson 2009), which assumes that time is to be put to use, and learning goals frustrated by wasting it, creating “‘flaws’ in the educational process” (Belton and Priyadharshini 2007, p. 583. I am not convinced by these arguments that, to overcome these flaws, lecturers must become more entertaining and more technologically experimental; these actions continue to cloud the issue. What is needed is to embrace ontologically the phenomenon of boredom and to listen to its mystery that the mood of indifference can bring rather than run away from the fear of the undisclosed by filling time with inauthentic superficiality.

Heidegger and the Experience of Boredom
	The contribution of Heidegger’s work on boredom might be seen as an extension of Being and Time  in its phenomenological approach to the everydayness of our lived experience.   Especially relevant is Heidegger’s exploration of the ontological characteristics of moods and in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics the most fundamental of moods– boredom.  In this Heidegger emphasises the practicality of knowledge and this approach can be read as an extension of Plato’s Sophist where he focuses his attention on practical wisdom.  In this sense the development of profound boredom illustrates and confirms Heidegger’s analytic of the temporal nature of Dasein as the temporal groundedness of our being in the world.  For Heidegger the issue of historicity and our everydayness are illustrated in our resistance to listen to the calls of profound boredom and so to authentically face our everyday conformity which entraps our curiosity and our fate.  In this reading Heidegger notion of boredom one is bored but not alienated from society as a whole but potentially reflective or apathetic, as if at a distance, of what the norms for behaviour have become.  This Weltanschauung is all the more perverse in that this mood or indifferent reflection or apathetic acceptance  not only supports a dominant way of coping in a world of utility and consumption by being busy it also provides the conditions, when recognised and resolutely grasped, for the disclosure of our resolute being.  This contradiction is perhaps most clearly stated by Heidegger when he suggests that profound boredom drifts, “here and there in the abysses of our existence like a muffling fog, removes al things and human beings and oneself along with them into a remarkable indifference.  This boredom manifests being as a whole”  (Heidegger, 2007, p.87) .  	
	Heidegger’s analysis of boredom is through the temporal structure of attunements (moods) and their public manifestations in ways that are understandable to others.   For Heidegger the inauthentic management of being bored in time is not, I suggest, a negative response to the frustration wiith the everyday disruption to our everyday life.  It provides an understandable and common response to things not being ready-at-hand. It central temporal characterises are of not being able to use time effectively, wasting time which could be utilised for other busyness.  We become bored when things in datable time don’t entertain, satisfy us or are readily consumable.  Heidegger uses terms such as  being left in limbo by time as it drags along (and of coming to be left empty by things in general by the individual beings around us in a specific boring situation).
	Heidegger analyses the phenomena of boredom into three forms. In the first form of boredom we become bored by something, we try to shake off time. The passing of time is “a driving away of boredom that drives time on” (Heidegger 1995, p. 93). We seek to shorten time, to make it pass more quickly. In passing the time, we are thus in “a confrontation with time” (Heidegger 1995, p. 96): “we fight against the progress of time which is slowing down and is too slow for us” (1995, p. 97). Time drags and thus paralyzes us (1995, pp. 97–98). Thus, “becoming bored is a being held in limbo by time as it drags over an interval of time” (1995, p. 100). 
Heidegger’s second form of boredom is when we are “bored with”, in the sense that “I bore myself” (Boss 2009, p. 93). Heidegger offers the example of a uneventful dinner party where nothing specific was found to be boring but, on reflection, the evening was a waste of one’s time. There is no single activity; rather, it is “our entire comportment and behavior that is our passing the time” (Heidegger 1995, p. 112). In this sense, “[the] evening is that with which we are bored, and simultaneously, what we are bored with is passing the time” (iid, p. 113). This second form of boredom manifests itself quite differently from the first; rather than being bored at, we are bored with. This prompts Heidegger to inquire further into its structural moments. His insight is that by “leaving ourselves behind in abandoning ourselves to whatever there is going on, an emptiness can form” (ibid, p. 119), but this emptiness is not of anything in particular. Rather than an already present emptiness that remains unfulfilled by the refusal of entities to satisfy us (as with the first form of boredom), the emptiness in this second form of boredom comes from us. This is why we speak of ourselves as being bored; the boredom is not situational, but proceeds from our disappointment at the loss of “time” that proceeds from using it trivially and without purpose.  
In an effort to disclose how we are held in limbo in this second form of boredom, Heidegger considers us to have taken the flow of time and replaced it with a “standing of time” and a prolonged “now”. This “standing of time is a more originary holding in limbo, which is to say oppressing” (ibid, p. 122). Standing time is when “our whole time is compressed into the standing ‘now’ of the duration of the evening” (ibid p. 125), and standing now “which sets us in place (summons us) is what bores us” (ibid, p. 126). We are held up in the “standing now”. Heidegger sees this type of boredom, an indeterminate boredom, as being more profound than the first form and relates it to our everyday notion of a boring life; a life going nowhere and without an understanding of how to temporalize ourselves from this standing of time. We cannot plan or reflect, for we have nothing upon which to focus our attention.  As such we tend to play out as an example of Nietsche’s the ‘eternal return of the same’. We marry a similar person, join another but ‘different’ university, or turn to surfing the internet aimlessly for our learning experiences. This form of boredom is less likely to be recognized in public as the first, and is often suppressed. It may go undetected until it bursts forth in unpredictable and often destructive ways – walking out from university with no idea what to do, and falling into a spiral of self-doubt. Each of these two forms of boredom, however, shares the common constitution of “being held up and being left empty” (Boss 2009, p. 95).
	Heidegger’s third form of boredom is a profound boredom, disclosing itself “whenever we say or... silently know that it is boring for one” (1995, p. 134). Heidegger’s use of the one or das man is anything but unintentional.  The interpretation of das man in Heidegger’s work is controversial in that it is the entrainment of the inauthentic and seen (by some) in opposition to the disclosure of oneself authentically.  The contradiction embedded in das man is that we needs to confirm, at least in the development of an understanding, to the   tradition and practice which make our world intelligible to us.  An obvious example would be language (“What is said in the talk gets understood......We have the same thing in view, be it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 168). However, the need for conformity can also deprive Dasein of an originality of purpose id conformity becomes conformism.   The degree of conformity then is one which is situational and neither negative nor positive per se yet for sure it is restrictive, creating acceptable models of behaviour and forms of cooperation. The acceptance by ‘doing what one does in these circumstances’ in their shared everyday coping practices which conform to certain norms;  Often it is only when we are forced to question what we take as the way to be, when for instance the inconspicuous acts reveal themselves in failure that we might question our own stance and that of others. By highlighting the way of being as the one in profound boredom, Heidegger calls upon us to listen to ‘the one’ and through this engagement grasp resolutely from within the one the potential to disclose ourselves authentically.  For not to do so Dasein is diffused into das man and lost to itself in its everydayness. 
	For Heidegger the exploration of profound boredom results in a conformation that Dasein’s being is temporal and entranced by the attunement of indifference which is “enveloping beings as a whole” (Heidegger, 1995 p. 138).  Moreover in this mood of indifference we are able to ascertain, although will not necessarily do so, and are unable to act upon, the possibilities of Dasein.  This mood is general, indeterminate, a non-specific way of being and leaves a sense of emptiness, a feeling of being in limbo.  Profound Boredom’s telling refusal announces these potentialities but is entranced by time and so is unable to liberate one self to act Heidegger explains, “(t)his resolute self-disclosure of Dasein to itself, however, namely in each case to be in the midst of beings what it is given to be in its determinateness – this resolute self –disclosure is the moment of vision [Augenblick]” (Ibid, p. 149). Biceaga (2006, p. 147) describes it, is “having one’s possibilities suspended” and confronts us with a refusal that simultaneously calls attention to those possibilities that have been left unexploited. Profound boredom compels one to seize upon or enact one’s own most possibilities in the extremity of the moment of vision.  Profound boredom and the occurrence of a moment of vision drive one toward resolute self-disclosure; a moment of vision reveals profound boredom as the positive attunement it is. 







The Moments of vision as the basis of learning from profound boredom’s announcement of the telling refusal

Heidegger’s most extensive discussion of the moment of vision is in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, here, he answers his own question on why the nature of time in its originary form is made manifest​[3]​, claiming that it is only in the moment of vision that resolute disclosure of self occurs. Moreover, being resolute in this moment offers a transformation from indifference to taking a stance on being, that is, making a response that, in coming into being, is the disclosure of the moment of vision.  Such a stance reintroduces us into the midst of others, but in an authentic rather than a falling, inauthentic manner. It comes to mean explicitly to stand in a new way, between the past and the possible. To do so, one must enter into the ecstasies of originary and, if we are to open ourselves to the opportunity to progress to becoming, we need to be prepared to face resolutely the potential angst of  profound boredom, from where we can transcend the one and become what is now possible for oneself. These capabilities need to be learnt and their application guided by judgement.
For Heidegger, the moment of vision is the authentic mode of being present at a decisive moment in which Dasein, breaks out of the banality of the one and takes over its situation . He writes that the “present which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, we call the ‘moment of vision’” (1962, p. 387). The moment of vision is not “now”, taken as a point: it is ecstasis. From the ecstatic character of the moment of vision, Heidegger’s following words are more than clear: “It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is held in resoluteness” (ibid, p. 387). The italics are in the original and point to the moment of our combining past, present and future rather than holding them apart, making all three accessible. As Blattner suggests, the “moment of vision encompasses who I find myself to be and am able to go forward as” (2006, p. 166). It allows us to understand our current position and it forms part of our future life; the moment of vision opens and discloses the future. The moment is deliberative and insightful; it is not a sudden flight of fancy, but a resolute engagement of the capabilities and potential for being and action. “Dasein resolutely discloses [sich entschließt] itself to itself” (1995, p. 149). In it, “a being impelled through entrancing time into that time itself, into its proper essence, i.e. towards the moment of vision as the fundamental possibility of Dasein’s existence proper” (ibid) in which the full situation of an action opens itself, and keeps itself open, “the third form of boredom  is determined through and through the essence of time” (1995, p. 150). 
The moment of vision, however, is not to be considered as a moment of time in the sense of an instant (McNeill 1999). It is the unfolding of the presencing of the situation in respect to the appositeness of the situation. As McNeill states, an “Augenblick does not preclude, but indeed demands a certain duration, albeit a finite one” (1999, p. 116). Indeed, the insight might begin in a moment, but has its own intrinsic duration and intensity. Such a claim, unconcealed through a moment of vision, thrusts boredom into a new and important light. This seems very like what Heidegger means by those special moments of vision evoked by profound boredom, and which have obvious links to notions of detachment or enlightenment in Buddhism (Zimmerman 1993), a wholeness that he calls the bringing together of the three forms of temporal being. 
The insight for action may be private but is enacted in the public and to be effective need to be executed in a timely way.  In this way the Kairos of resolute self disclosure is, in a sense, similar in form to phronēsis (practical wisdom) where not only the capability and vision to act are important, but so is an understanding of the impact of such action in a particular situation.  In Heidegger’s terms, irresolute Dasein responds to the general situation whereas resolute Dasein responds to the concrete Situation. Phronēsis is an awakening resolutely to, an attunement to the temporal horizons associated with authenticity.  As Heidegger suggests in Plato’s Sophist, “in φρόυησιζ [phronesis] …in a momentary glance I survey the concrete situation of the action, out of which and in favor of which I resolve myself.” (2007, p.114)  Dreyfus explores these more and fully suggests that “Like the phronimos, the resolute individual presumably does what is retroactively recognized by others as appropriate, but what one does is not the taken-for-granted, average right thing—not what one does—but what his or her past experience leads him or her to do, given his spontaneous understanding of that particular Situation. (2004, p.269).  The practical wisdom of the phronimos , according to Brogan, “lies in the capacity to call himself or herself back resolutely”  2005, p.147).  The resolute phronimos merely experiences his thrownness and so has the sense that the social norms are not rules to be rigidly followed. He therefore gives up a banal, general understanding of social norms and responds to the concrete Situation (ibid, p272)  


Listening to the telling refusal of profound boredom not pushing it away, a way of learning to be

Boredom, Heidegger would argue is an essential attune of our being. To understand how this might be we need to resolutely push forward into it. And in doings so we can use it to reawaken our authenticity.  Alternatively we can try to escape it by ignoring it.  Heidegger advocates the former arguing that  that we must be opposed to boredom rather we should ‘make room for it ...not to resist straightaway but to let it resonate”’ (1995, p.82) It is this  awakening that I  have suggested that moments of vision are more receptively perceived and hermeneutically interpreted. This to claim that moments of vision are themselves the causal power that turns potentiality into practice, for this causal power might best be considered.  Moreover, the experience which is brought to bear in a particular situation and moment is ever growing in refinement and is held back as the potential of the actor and made evident by the deliberative decision to act 
In this interpretation of dunamis as a means of resolute disclosure authentically enacted we can understand Heidegger’s claim that “(O)nly in resolution do we find resoluteness sure of itself” (1962, p.298) This is brought about by an interpretation of what is decided upon to have appropriate consequences for others for Heidegger continues, “what one resolves upon in resoluteness has been  prescribed ontologically in the existentiality of Dasein in general as a potentiality-for-Being in the manner of concernful Solicitude” (ibid).  Heidegger recognises that dunamis is the condition of being that enables one to change in a particular situation and being able to act. Further, once acted we return to the commonsense ambiguity of a publicness where we resolve nothing but to be as one ought to be.
Philosophically, questions similar to these are raised by Heidegger in his lecture series Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Vols. 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force (1995), where he explores the nature of dunamis through a manner of being-at-work (Heidegger, 1995a: 143), and more recently discussed in detail by Brogan (2005) and, poignantly, by Mei (2009). According to Heidegger the actualization of a capability itself can be present but held back and not being used or it is enacted, it is potential to be. This ontologically renders dunamis both as a mode of practice and the potential to be able to practice. It is both that which the force to enable action and holding back are together a mode of disclosing and affirming within oneself what is understood to be practised.  It is dunamis’s possibility of transformative change from capacity to producing that is disclosed in the moment of vision; it is the force for being that is dumanis which shines in the clearing provided by the indifference of profound boredom amid the clutter of our inauthentic busy everydayness. When we operate routinely fall short of authentic disclosed and shut out the moment of vision.  When do notice the moment we are led to action by the transparency of our resolve to disclose ourselves.  We are always, potential aware of this held back dunamis by the telling refusal of profound boredom which, when listened to makes audible our being
Learning needs to be embraced from others in order that the stance on taken can is grounded in the intelligible practices of ones work world.  Learning practices builds the potential and the energy to remain in a ceaseless state of learning ready to face resolutely the unanticipated future as oneself. . The form of action is driven by our dispositional and propositional knowledge and is dependent on the practices we learn in formal and informal environments; they provide the understanding and intelligibility to our shared public world with others.  However, it may also suppress the expression of authenticity in the search for the security of ‘the one’.  This closing off of one’s potentiality for the comfort of the anonymity of ‘the one’ a levelling down of our potential for being occurs which reduces our horizons to that of mediocrity.  Accepting this is to turn our backs on the possible the revelation of the moment of vision.  In doing so it may hide our capability in our indifference.  Our potentiality our intent is degenerated by our conformism and it is this that moment of visions confront but only when we are to comprehend them. However, the potency of our resoluteness is undisclosed and may remain so if we are unable to recognise within us the capability to undertake authentic acts. 
	However, learned competences alone are not sufficient to release us into the transformative authenticity of the moment of vision.   The implication of not taking this action is to leave us vulnerable to manipulation and to nihilism. Heidegger has something to say specifically about learning and profound boredom; fundamental emptiness bores us, and leaves us feeling smug and contented in not being endangered. It makes us weaken our resolution in taking a stand on our essence. He notes that:

(W)e concern ourselves only with learned competencies that can be instilled. The present is full of pedagogical problems and questions. Strength and power, however, can never be replaced by the accumulation of learned competencies, rather if anything is achieved by the latter it is the suffocation of all such things. (Heidegger 1995, p. 164) 

	Seemingly Heidegger is saying that our capability  to act meaningfully is dependent upon but not sufficiently satisfied by a collection of competencies.  The inadequacy of knowing what but not recognising ‘when’ and ‘how’.  This inability to conceive hermeneutically of a situation where we can move ahead, resolutely,  is especially evident when  brought to the fore in profound boredom. Here, we are confronted with what our authenticity might be. We need to choose to not to  turn away from it or to ignore it. In the moment of vision  one is left to review oneself within the context of being. It comes upon us and compels us to consider our own authenticity, and to respond in a way that reflects on the potentiality within our way of being that we have overlooked or abandoned. In these moments of vision we see our potential and are forced to make decisions about the nature of our future. 
	During profound boredom’s moment of vision, a glimpse may be seen of what might be in store and, at that moment, ways of achieving this new route to authentic being may be disclosed acted upon to creates something worthy. For those workplaces able to combine these insights and interact with the learner, fresh ideas may be harnessed that are both effective and involving for thing seen ready or present at hand may be considered differently. Such liberating insights encourage our capability, dunamis, having been learnt of everday practices, to be creatively disclosed. It is when being in the world is unsettled by the indifference of profound boredom that something else might show itself, if we open ourselves to the experience rather than shut it off. This is not to encourage profound boredom as a way of being; far from it, for in modern society this boredom is inevitable. However, listening to the mystery of profound boredom may show the way to  reveal the stance one wants to take on being and in an educational context develop  in students a more reflexive way back to themselves (Mansikka, 2009).
.
The moment of vision as a moment of edification
The concealment through social institutions of the profound boredom  from us  yet its nuture through educational workplaces tends to support is by offering forms of systematic, commoditification of our temporal being (Gibbs 2009). We use time and the events packed into it as a way of organizing ourselves; semester, credit hours, examination dates. This commoditized time leaves no opportunity for a break or a rest from the reproduction of activities, no time for moments of vision to reveal the profound boredom that this ongoing activity represents for one. For Heidegger these are symptoms of a modern world that is profound boring but in which the boredom is hidden in our everyday practices.  When profoundly bored we are, however, aware of what we are not and when this boredom is ruptured by moments of vision we are potentially able to realise our authenticity, not necessarily  as a radical change in our way of being but in a different way of looking at our being.  For Heidegger,”The moment of vision is a look of a unique kind, which we call the look of resolute discloseness for action in the specific situation in which Dasein finds itself disposed in each case” (1995, p. 151)
	 I want to suggest that Rorty’s notion of edification (1979) offer an approach which may make a contribution in terms of unconcealment of profound boredom, and as a way of framing an edifying experience, one where understanding of oneself takes precedence over making decisions. The importance to education of the moment of vision is in its disclosure of what is other than the banal and the norm of our profound boredom.  It is not that such a state does not offer up opportunities for learning  - for clearly they  - do but they are of a form that makes intelligible the prime educational purspose.  Moreover it is in this sense always an “understanding of what is learned is bound up with the anonymous authority of a shared practice” (Olsen, 1998, p.38).  Indeed this may be a necessary condition in order that our future has an intelligibility about it. What is unclear is whether any opportunity for an authentic disclosure of what is of concern to us, the learner, is not realized.  This seeking of authenticity in the concern we express about the accepted norm is what Rorty might claim is achieved by the ironist through a process of edification.
	The task for education then is twofold; to encourage a new space to reveal one’s profound boredom with the world as it is every day, and to provide the technical, moral and intellectual skills to make sense of this newness. Heidegger suggests as much by claiming that education is the “very foundation of our being as human.”  (2007:167).  and that “real education lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entity by first of all leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to it” (2007, 167).  Education in Heidegger’s sense is ontological and requires us to examine and question what we have come to know as true in the shaping of our being.   In Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s cave (Plato’s Doctrine of Truth) the movement which Heidegger describes is the move to understanding and changing the way one comports to the concealed, in a progressive unconcealing in search of truth and understanding of being. 
 For Heidegger, education is understanding the essential being of our world of which we are a part. Thompson explains this as Heidegger offering ‘ways of restoring meaning to the increasingly formal and empty ideals guiding contemporary education’ (2005, 143). Such a restoration, however, is not something that can be packaged for consumption. It is ontological and is more like the education suggested by Rorty as edifying. This ontological approach has not the linearity of production, but the grasping of meaning in terms of temporality. The difference is that instead of the being as the objective presence, it is being that can project its own possibility
This is the edifying process for education that Rorty speaks of. As he puts it, “edifying discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings” (1979, p. 360). This is not to discount objective inquiry, but to place it as one among many ways of knowing oneself. Again, I want to suggest that edification is a revealed learning from, and reacting to, the rupture of the moment of vision that shows our everyday profound boredom. 
	The result is a pedagogy that blends what we take as known, but stops short of claiming that it should be the determinant of our identity. As such, it is unlike the mass production model of accredited courses in formal educational settings, or the accelerated apprenticeships currently on offer, although the former does have a role to play. It requires us to allow the knowledge of being authentically in the world to be made manifest by the learner, using skills and judgement to turn upon the acculturated education that provides these very skills in the first place. Rorty takes this point seriously both in the Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), but more publically in his essay Education as Socialization and as Individualization (1999), where he makes clear that the role of compulsory education is to acculturate for the development of das man, to provide the education that one is given by society and the role of higher education is to critical question those practices as as ironists.. He accepts the difficulties of implementation, but bases his argument on the need, a prerequisite of formal early education, for tools and language sufficient to question one’s being.
 	For this to work, all stakeholders to an edifying process will need to be engaged. This is a radical and profound change in our way of being and will confront many of the taken-for-granted norms of our society. Not to do so will mean that the glimpse of a freer, more authentic future will be lost and we will continue rapidly to lose our self-identity to the anomie of an extended present. 
	This approach is different from determining the quality of the delivery of education by looking at what leaves students bored, in the sense of emptiness or in limbo. It is this that has attracted contemporary research into performativity that, although not without merit, fails to deal with the greater underlying issue in any edifying process: the development of the individual fsor their own sake. What is needed is an edifying process to help develop the moment of vision as a way of dwelling. As Mc Neil says, it is not “something that can simply be achieved once and for all. It entails, rather, learning to dwell in this very coming, in the properly finite element of the moment of vision. Such learning, presumably, as preparation and building would be the most proper action of originary thinking” (1999, p. 218). Some may argue that this already exists, conversations framed by the consumerist context of higher education, of market forces or through the stewardship of external accrediting bodies reified in the Bologna process or self-sustaining as in the USA.  However, these are not edifying conversations of Rortyan ironists but commonsensical iterative dialogues of those who have forgone pushing barriers and have settled for gently bouncing them!

Concluding comments








Belton, T., & Priyadharshini, E. (2007) Boredom and schooling: a cross-disciplinary exploration. Cambridge Journal of Education, 27(4): 579–595. 
Benjamin, W. (2002) The Arcades project. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Biceaga, V. (2006) Temporality and boredom. Continental Philosophy Review, 39(2): 135–153.
Blattner, W. (2006) Heidegger’s being and time. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. 
Boss, M. (2009) Metaphysic and the mood of deep boredom. In Barbara Dalle Pezze (Ed.), Essays on Boredom and Modernity, pp. 85–109. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Breidenstein, G. (2007) The meaning of boredom in school lessons. Participant observation in the seventh and eighth form. Ethnography and Education, 2(1): 93–108.
Brogan, W. A. (2005). Heidegger and Aristotle: The two foldness of being. New York: SUNY
Dahlin, B. (2009) On the path towards thinking: learning from Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Steiner. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 28(6): 537–554.
Dreyfus, H. (1992) Being-in-the-world. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dreyfus, H. (2004) What Could Be More Intelligible Than Everyday Intelligibility? Reinterpreting Division I of Being and Time in the Light of Division II, , Bulletin of Science Technology Society 24: 3 265-274
Gibbs, P. (2009) Adopting consumer time: potential issues for higher education. London Review of Education, 7(2): 113–124.
Goodstein, E. S. (2005) Experience without qualities: boredom and modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962) Being and time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell.
Heidegger, M. (1977) The question concerning technology. In D. F. Krell (trans.), Basic writings (pp. 307–342). London: Routledge.
Heidegger, M. (1995) The fundamental concepts of metaphysics, world, finitude, solicitude, trans. W. McNeill & N. Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1995a). Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Vols. 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force. Trans. W. Brogan & P. Warnek. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2007) What is Metaphysics? In W. McNeill (Ed.), Martin Heidegger pathways, pp.  82–96.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Heidegger, M, (2007) Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, trans. T. Sheehan, in Pathmarks (Texts in German Philosophy). Ed. W. McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Husserl, E. (2008) On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893–1917). Amsterdam: Springer Publishing.
Kant, I. (2001) Lectures on ethics (trans. P. Heath). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kierkegaard, S. (2004) Either/or: a fragment of life (trans. A. Hannay). Penguin Books: London.
McDonald, W. (2009) Kierkegaard's demonic boredom. In Barbara Dalle Pezze (Ed.), Essays on boredom and modernity, pp. 61–85. Amsterdam: Rodop BV.I.
McNeill, W. (1999) The glance of the eye, Heidegger, Aristotle, and the ends of theory. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Mann, S., & Robinson, A. (2009) Boredom in the lecture theatre: an investigation into the contributors, moderators and outcomes of boredom amongst university students. British Educational Research Journal, 35(2): 243–258.
Mansikka, J-E. (2009) Can boredom educate us? Tracing a mood in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology from an educational point of view. Studies in Philosophy of Education, 28: 255–268.
Mei, T. S. (2009). Heidegger, Work and Being. London: Continuum Studies
Pezze, B. D., & Salzani, C. (2009) Essays on boredom and modernity. Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V.
Rorty, R. (1979) Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rorty, R. (1999) Education as socialization and as individualization. In R. Rorty (Ed.), Philosophy and social hope, pp. 114–127. London: Penguin Books.
Simmel, Georg (1991) Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; their place in cultural history. In H. Loiskandl, D. Weinstein & M. Weinstein (trans.), Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, pp. 3–12. Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
Stafford, S. P., & Gregory, W. T. (2006) Heidegger’s phenomenology of boredom, and the scientific investigation of conscious experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5: 155 –169.
Svendsen, L. (2005) A philosophy of boredom. London: Reaktion Books.
Thompson, I. (2005). . Heidegger on ontotheology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Ward, K. (2008) Augenblick. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
Witt, C.  2003, Ways of Being, Ithaca; Cornell University Press









^1	  Heidegger’s use of Augenblick as a moment of vision first appears in Macquarrie and Tobinson’s translation of Being and Time (1962), in a footnote on page 376. However, this translation is not without its detractors. McNeill 1999, for instance, prefers to refer to an Augenblick as the ‘glance of the eye’
^2	  For example, Albert Camus's Meursault who does not think about anything deeply. Is someone who characterieses vividly Heidegger’s notion of profound boredom
^3	  It is in this section of The Fundamental that Heidegger makes reference to Being and Time, Section 65, where he introduces the idea. Also on the following pages (pp. 150–151), he makes reference to Kierkegaard as the identifier of the idea but not developing it sufficiently.  Moreover Heidegger takes a different stance to Kierkegaard whose use of moment of vision causes fundamental restructuring of what is, was and might be-a change such as was experienced by St Paul in his  conversion.  For Heidegger the moment of vision acts to realign what is present at hand into a different understanding of their potential to be ready-at-hand. . 
